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The democratization of a national government is only a first step in the diffusion of democracy throughout a country's territory. Even after a national government is democratized, subnational authoritarian "enclaves" often continue to deny rights to citizens of local jurisdictions. Edward L. Gibson offers new theoretical perspectives for the study of democratization in his exploration of this phenomenon. His theory of "boundary control" captures the conflict pattern between incumbents and oppositions when a national democratic government exists alongside authoritarian provinces (or "states"). He also reveals how federalism and the territorial organization of countries shape how subnational authoritarian regimes are built and how they unravel. Through a novel comparison of the late nineteenth-century American "Solid South" with contemporary experiences in Argentina and Mexico, Gibson reveals that the mechanisms of boundary control are reproduced across countries and historical periods. As long as subnational authoritarian governments coexist with national democratic governments, boundary control will be at play.
- Sales Rank: #1514873 in Books
- Brand: Brand: Cambridge University Press
- Published on: 2013-01-07
- Released on: 2013-03-07
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Dimensions: 9.21" h x .47" w x 6.14" l, .75 pounds
- Binding: Paperback
- 208 pages
- Used Book in Good Condition
Review
"Gibson's conceptualization of boundary control as a key mechanism that facilitates the maintenance of subnational authoritarianism in the context of national level democracies is a foundational contribution to an important and growing literature. The explanation of dynamics in three very different cases - the "Solid South" in the United States, Argentina and Mexico - is compelling, and the book is beautifully written. This is a must-read for anybody interested in the complexities of democratization."
Evelyne Huber, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
"This is an imaginative and path-breaking book. The conceptual and theoretical work Gibson accomplishes will help usher in a new scholarly conversation made even more urgent by the uneven nature of democratizations since the "third wave". By taking a subnational turn in thinking about regime change, Gibson reveals how the rise of authoritarian rule and its demise are often much more complex and contradictory processes than we had realized. Comparativists - including their less parochial Americanist colleagues - can make great use of what Gibson has achieved."
Robert Mickey, University of Michigan
"Professor Gibson's ambitious new book involves a far-reaching reassessment of some core assumptions in comparative politics. It contests the bias toward the "national-level" unit of analysis, and proposes a more conceptually sophisticated understanding of territorial politics, with its specific logic and consequences. This approach is grounded on an insightful examination of some major instances that are not normally juxtaposed. In particular, Gibson looks at the US political system through a distinctive and illuminating comparative lens. This is a bold contribution likely to provoke a lively debate."
Laurence Whitehead, University of Oxford
"By opening up the black box of subnational politics, and problematizing the interaction between national and territorial regimes, Gibson provides an important contribution to the comparative study of democratization. Highly recommended."
S. P. Duffy, Choice
About the Author
Edward L. Gibson is Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University. He is the author of Class and Conservative Parties: Argentina in Comparative Perspective and editor of Federalism and Democracy in Latin America. He is also author of several scholarly articles on party politics, democratization and federalism. Professor Gibson has received awards from the National Science Foundation CAREER Program, the Howard Foundation and other institutions. He teaches courses on democratization, comparative politics, Latin American politics and federalism, and has received numerous teaching awards, including Northwestern University's McCormick Professorship of Teaching Excellence.
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Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Federal Democracies
By Michael Buehler
There have been two important developments in the comparative study of authoritarianism
in recent years. First, there is a renewed interest in the role of institutions in establishing and
maintaining authoritarianism (Schedler 2009; Pepinsky 2013). Second, a research agenda has
emerged that focuses on local authoritarianism and the obstacles to the spread of democracy
within countries in contrast to previous studies that examined authoritarianism in national
politics and the hurdles to the diffusion of democracy between countries (Moncada and
Snyder 2011). Edward Gibson’s book on subnational authoritarianism in federal democracies
is one of the first studies that combines and speaks to both research agendas.
Comparing the late-nineteenth century ‘‘Solid South’’ in the United States with
contemporary Argentina and Mexico, Gibson shows that the democratization of national
politics does not automatically eradicate authoritarianism at the subnational level. In all
three countries, local jurisdictions exist (or existed) where incumbents systematically and
repeatedly violate citizens’ rights ‘‘through the legal and illegal manipulation of
representative institutions’’ (p. 13) in order to rig the competitive political process in
their favor.
Since subnational authoritarian enclaves are embedded in a national political arena that is
democratic—a constellation Gibson calls ‘‘regime juxtaposition’’—local incumbents face
unique challenges. They not only have to pretend that they are committed to democratic
ideals but, more important, incumbents have to constantly fend off local and national
opponents to their rule. Hence, the emergence, endurance and end of subnational
authoritarianism depend on how successfully local autocrats protect the boundaries to
‘‘their’’ jurisdiction from challenges mounted by opposition forces.
Concretely, stronger political players have an interest in keeping a conflict as isolated as
possible, while weaker actors have an interest in bringing allies into a conflict. Therefore,
Gibson argues, local incumbents prevail if they manage to close the boundary to their
authoritarian jurisdiction, that is, if they succeed in keeping the scope of conflict localized by
preventing opposition forces access to outside allies and resources. In contrast, local
authoritarianism is threatened if opponents manage to open boundaries and nationalize a
conflict by bringing outside forces into the local fray.
Local hegemonic parties ‘‘are the most important institutional manifestation of
subnational authoritarianism in nationally democratic countries’’ (p. 27). Political parties are
the main vehicle to accumulate and maintain power in most nationally democratic countries.
Authoritarian local power holders cannot escape these party politics and therefore try to
establish hegemonic local parties to protect the boundaries of their province.
Authoritarian incumbents rely on three strategies to keep the boundaries to their
jurisdiction closed. First and foremost, they try to keep a conflict local. Second, incumbents
strive to secure national power in order to influence decisions about ‘‘their’’ jurisdiction
made by figures higher up in the administrative pecking order. Finally, authoritarian
incumbents make an effort to monopolize the linkages between national and local politics.
However, the degree of centralization between government layers, the distribution of
power within government layers and the empowerment of tiers of governments below the
province circumscribe the strategic opportunities of boundary closers. Concretely, local
authoritarian incumbents rely on legal and formal institutional rules to construct hegemonic
parties when provincial autonomy is high. In contrast, in countries where incumbents lord
over provinces with relatively low autonomy, they choose illegal and informal arrangements
to establish hegemonic parties. Furthermore, local authoritarian incumbents have strong
incentives to secure national influence in countries with centralized federalism. This is less
the case in more decentralized federal democracies where less power is concentrated at the
center. Finally, the institutional context also shapes the response to challenges from lower
rungs in the administrative hierarchy. In federal democracies with relatively high provincial
autonomy, it is easier for local autocrats to neutralize municipalities than in centralized
federations where municipalities are relatively autonomous from provinces.
A country’s institutional context also shapes the demise of subnational authoritarianism.
When subnational political entities have the powers to change local constitutions and
election laws it is almost impossible for opposition parties to win. Hence, authoritarian local
power holders will most likely be ousted through the intervention of national state
authorities. Such center-led transitions usually change the local rules of the game. When
provinces have comparatively few powers to shape local institutions and elections laws,
however, coalitions between national and local parties are more likely to dismantle local
authoritarianism. Such party-led transitions usually occur within the framework of existing
rules and regulations.
Based on this theoretical framework, developed and summarized in Chapters 2 and 6,
respectively, Gibson compares cases of local authoritarianism in the United States, Argentina,
and Mexico and identifies distinct patterns of boundary control in each case.
In Chapter 3, Gibson analyzes the ‘‘Solid South’’ in the United States in the late
nineteenth century. He shows how strategies of boundary control have changed in the
American South as the country’s territorial regime transitioned from high centralization
during the Reconstruction-period to a highly peripheralized system after Reconstruction.
Concretely, during the Reconstruction era’s centralized federalism, local autocrats relied on
informal and illegal tactics to control the boundary to their jurisdiction. As soon as
decentralized federalism had been restored, local incumbents relied on institutional means to
rig the system in their favor. Furthermore, the asymmetrical representation of states in
national politics helped Southern autocrats, as did the relatively strong powers of states in
quelling opposition from urban electorates. The eventual transition to more democratic
forms of government was center-led. in the United States in the late
nineteenth century. He shows how strategies of boundary control have changed in the
American South as the country’s territorial regime transitioned from high centralization
during the Reconstruction-period to a highly peripheralized system after Reconstruction.
Concretely, during the Reconstruction era’s centralized federalism, local autocrats relied on
informal and illegal tactics to control the boundary to their jurisdiction. As soon as
decentralized federalism had been restored, local incumbents relied on institutional means to
rig the system in their favor. Furthermore, the asymmetrical representation of states in
national politics helped Southern autocrats, as did the relatively strong powers of states in
quelling opposition from urban electorates. The eventual transition to more democratic
forms of government was center-led.in the United States in the late
nineteenth century. He shows how strategies of boundary control have changed in the
American South as the country’s territorial regime transitioned from high centralization
during the Reconstruction-period to a highly peripheralized system after Reconstruction.
Concretely, during the Reconstruction era’s centralized federalism, local autocrats relied on
informal and illegal tactics to control the boundary to their jurisdiction. As soon as
decentralized federalism had been restored, local incumbents relied on institutional means to
rig the system in their favor. Furthermore, the asymmetrical representation of states in
national politics helped Southern autocrats, as did the relatively strong powers of states in
quelling opposition from urban electorates. The eventual transition to more democratic
forms of government was center-led. in the United States in the late
nineteenth century. He shows how strategies of boundary control have changed in the
American South as the country’s territorial regime transitioned from high centralization
during the Reconstruction-period to a highly peripheralized system after Reconstruction.
Concretely, during the Reconstruction era’s centralized federalism, local autocrats relied on
informal and illegal tactics to control the boundary to their jurisdiction. As soon as
decentralized federalism had been restored, local incumbents relied on institutional means to
rig the system in their favor. Furthermore, the asymmetrical representation of states in
national politics helped Southern autocrats, as did the relatively strong powers of states in
quelling opposition from urban electorates. The eventual transition to more democratic
forms of government was center-led.in the United States in the late
nineteenth century. He shows how strategies of boundary control have changed in the
American South as the country’s territorial regime transitioned from high centralization
during the Reconstruction-period to a highly peripheralized system after Reconstruction.
Concretely, during the Reconstruction era’s centralized federalism, local autocrats relied on
informal and illegal tactics to control the boundary to their jurisdiction. As soon as
decentralized federalism had been restored, local incumbents relied on institutional means to
rig the system in their favor. Furthermore, the asymmetrical representation of states in
national politics helped Southern autocrats, as did the relatively strong powers of states in
quelling opposition from urban electorates. The eventual transition to more democratic
forms of government was center-led.
In Chapter 4, Gibson shows that the territorial regime in Argentina shares many
characteristics with American federalism after Reconstruction. A high degree of political
decentralization provides governors with considerable discretion over provincial constitutions,
electoral laws as well as economic and political life. The power of provinces in national
politics is also asymmetrical, with low-population provinces being overrepresented. Finally,
provinces enjoy far-reaching powers vis-a`-vis municipalities.
These contours of Argentinian federalism shape the strategies of boundary control. The
parochialization of power occurs through formal and legal channels. Illegal means of
boundary control are hardly necessary as the highly empowered governors can simply craft
the local electoral system in a way that neutralizes threats to their rule. Furthermore, the
asymmetrical representation of provinces in national politics creates incentives for local
autocrats to become involved in national politics as a strategy of boundary control. Finally,
due to the wide-ranging powers of provinces, it is comparatively easy for local autocrats to
offset recalcitrant municipalities. As in the American South, transitions toward more
democratic forms of local government in Argentina are almost always center-led.
In Chapter 5, Gibson examines subnational authoritarianism in Mexico. There, the
constitution and electoral regulations limit the powers of provincial governors to craft local
electoral systems, while national courts and election monitoring agencies supervise the
administration of local elections. By contrast, the national institutions grant considerable
political and fiscal autonomy to cities. In short, Mexico’s territorial regime is nonperipheralized
and municipality-empowering, which makes the power base of provincial
autocrats in Mexico much more vulnerable and contested than that of local strongmen in
the American South and Argentina.
Accordingly, Mexican provincial autocrats resort to informal and illegal means, such as
the illicit appropriation of public funds, electoral fraud and the manipulation of national
politics to close the boundaries to their jurisdiction. They are also much more constrained in
wielding influence in the national legislature. Additionally, provincial autocrats have to
spend considerable time and resources to neutralize electoral assaults on the governorship
that arise from the relatively autonomous municipalities. Against this backdrop, hegemonic
local parties in Mexico were not swept away by national intervention, as was the case in the
United States and Argentina. Instead, they crumbled due to the pressures exerted by alliances
between local and national opposition parties that managed, slowly but steadily, to wrest
patronage networks, fiscal flows and taxable jurisdictions from local autocrats.
To summarize, these comparative chapters show that boundary control occurs across
time and context whenever regime juxtaposition exists. The distinct forms of boundary
control, however, were shaped by the broader national institutional contexts, namely:
whether a system was centralized or decentralized; whether provinces were represented in
national politics relatively symmetrically or asymmetrically; and what powers had been given
to municipalities.
Overall, Gibson offers a sophisticated and original model to understand the variegated
patterns of subnational authoritarianism in federal democracies. It would have been
interesting to learn more about the applicability of his theory to other contexts. For instance,
through which channels does boundary control occur in federations where party
institutionalization is weak and where party systems are poorly consolidated? (Hale 2006)
Gibson suggests that ‘‘private civil society organizations’’ (p. 12) may vertically integrate
different government layers and therefore substitute for the absence of party networks.
Gibson also mentions briefly that the parochialization of power in federations where national party institutionalization is low may occur through ‘‘bureaucratic control’’ (p. 26).
Unfortunately, the book does not elaborate on these points.
More important, placing institutions at the center of his explanation for variegated
patterns of local despotism in federal democracies, Gibson argues that there is nothing
preordained about subnational authoritarianism. It does not simply ‘‘emerge’’ as a
consequence of local conditions but is actively built. It is also decisively nonlocal in origins
since it is the result of complex processes involving all levels of government.
This is in stark contrast to previous works on subnational authoritarianism that have
emphasized the importance of conditions intrinsic to authoritarian enclaves, including
historically grown local networks (Migdal 1988) and economic characteristics (Sidel 2014).
To strengthen the book’s argument about the causal primacy of institutions in shaping local
despotism vis-a`-vis such earlier works, Gibson could have more explicitly ruled out
aforementioned competing explanations in the substantive chapters of his book. For
instance, it would have helped if the local economies in the provinces compared had been
briefly examined to show why they cannot explain the emergence of subnational
authoritarianism.
Also, why do local strongmen exist in political systems that are not based on the
territorial regimes common in federations? While Gibson makes it very clear that he presents
a theory for subnational authoritarianism in federal democracies where territorial regimes are
relatively heterogeneous both between and within countries, it would have been illuminating
to learn more about the importance of institutions in shaping subnational authoritarianism
in nationally democratic but decentralized unitary states. Not only does subnational
authoritarianism flourish in such countries, too, but there is also considerable variance
within these states with regard to the emergence, longevity, and demise of local despotism
despite the fact that territorial regimes are much more homogenous, and national level
control over subnational entities is usually considerable. Arguably, the manipulation of
institutions by subnational players is more difficult in such countries. Hence, economic
conditions such as the concentration of industrialization or landownership patterns may
explain better why local authoritarianism emerges, survives, and occasionally collapses.
Nevertheless, Gibson’s landmark study is as timely and important for the debate about
subnational authoritarianism in decentralized unitary states as it is for federal democracies
because its emphasis on institutions and intergovernmental relations suggests the crucial
importance of ‘‘the state’’ and the dynamics within it for our understanding of subnational
authoritarianism.
References
Hale, Henry E. 2006. Why not parties in Russia?: Democracy, federalism, and the state.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Migdal, Joel S. 1988. Strong societies and weak states: state-society relations and state
capabilities in the Third World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Moncada, Eduardo, and Richard Snyder. 2011. Subnational comparative research on
democracy: Taking stock and looking forward. Comparative Democratization-Newsletter
of the Section 35 of the American Political Science Association (APSA). Brooklyn: Social
Science Research Council.
Pepinsky, Thomas. 2013. The institutional turn in comparative authoritarianism. British
Journal of Political Science, doi:10.1017/S0007123413000021: 1–23.
Schedler, Andreas. 2009. The new institutionalism in the study of authoritarian regimes.
Totalitarianism and Democracy 6 (2): 327–44.
Sidel, John T. 2014. Economic foundations of subnational authoritarianism: Insights and
evidence from qualitative and quantitative research. Democratization 21 (1): 161–84.
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